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Abstract: With an increasing expected energy demand and current dominance of coal electrification,
India plays a major role in global carbon policies and the future low-carbon transformation. This paper
explores three energy pathways for India until 2050 by applying the linear, cost-minimizing, global
energy system model (GENeSYS-MOD). The benchmark scenario “limited emissions only” (LEO)
is based on ambitious targets set out by the Paris Agreement. A more conservative “business
as usual” (BAU) scenario is sketched out along the lines of the New Policies scenario from the
International Energy Agency (IEA). On the more ambitious side, we explore the potential implications
of supplying the Indian economy entirely with renewable energies with the “100% renewable energy
sources” (100% RES) scenario. Overall, our results suggest that a transformation process towards
a low-carbon energy system in the power, heat, and transportation sectors until 2050 is technically
feasible. Solar power is likely to establish itself as the key energy source by 2050 in all scenarios,
given the model’s underlying emission limits and technical parameters. The paper concludes with
an analysis of potential social, economic and political barriers to be overcome for the needed Indian
low-carbon transformation.
Keywords: energy system modeling; decarbonization; global energy system model (GENeSYS-MOD);
renewables; India; energy transformation; energy transition; sector coupling
1. Introduction
India is one of the crucial actors when international climate mitigation goals are to be met. Today,
the country already contributes almost 18% to the world’s population and is set to account for around
one-quarter of the projected rise in global energy demand by 2040 [1].
In 2015, India emitted 1869 Mt CO2 in total, of which 51% came from power and heat generation.
At present, the Central Electricity Authority of India (CEA) projects total estimated CO2 emissions of
983 million tons for the year 2021–2022 and 1165 million tons in 2026–2027 [2]. The main driver of this
absolute increase is expected growth of total energy demand. The projected peak demand is 235 GW,
with an overall energy requirement of 1611 TWh at the end of the year 2022 [2]. Energy consumption
is expected to rise further by 32% from 2022 to 2027 [2].
India submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) on 1 October 2015.
On the national level for India, it implies three key goals to achieve this agreement:
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(i) to reduce the emissions per gross domestic product (GDP) output by 33% to 35% by 2030 from
2005 levels;
(ii) to increase the cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy
resources up to 40% by 2030;
(iii) to create an additional carbon sink of 2.5–3 billion tons of CO2 equivalent through additional
forest and tree cover by 2030 [3].
The Draft National Electricity Plan by the CEA [2] includes the INDCs, targeting a path of
electricity generation and reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in line with the Paris pledges.
By contributing to global climate efforts, India pursues international but also domestic objectives.
The adverse consequences of climate change have a significant impact on the Indian population and
economy, as weather extremes influence the important agriculture sector and the security of food
supply [4]. Furthermore, the rise of the world temperature affects India through climate migration,
water scarcity, and famine. In addition, the energy sector is an important element of India’s future
development strategy, seeking to reduce poverty, reduce local pollutants, and assure access to electricity
for all [5]. Along with the aim to achieve the sustainable development goals (SDG), especially SDG7
“Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all” and SDG13 “Take urgent
action to combat climate change and its impacts” established by the United Nations (UN), India seeks
to make its energy system sustainable, and thereby enhance the population’s living conditions.
According to the 2015 Paris climate agreement, India will revise and resubmit its INDCs
by 2020. In this context, the potential contributions of sustainable energy supply have received
particular interest, e.g., the future of coal as the baseload power, the potential role of natural gas as
a “transformation fuel”, and the potential of renewable energy to contribute to sustainable energy
development. Given the global acceleration of renewable deployment, in particular solar energy,
the INDCs currently developed for 2020 may be more ambitions than those back in 2015, and perhaps
not even more expensive.
In addition to meeting targeted climate goals, India may benefit from a fast energy transition from
both a sustainable energy and a geopolitical perspective, due to its current dependency on fossil fuels
and energy imports [6].
There is a broad and growing literature base on the perspectives of the Indian energy system,
to which our paper seeks to contribute. Bhushan [7,8] laid out the principle challenges to governance
of energy resources for India that are still valid today, e.g., the energy–poverty challenge, central and
regional coordination, the role of coal, nuclear, and renewables, and the insertion of India into global
resource markets and innovation systems. Bhushan [8] stressed that India is expected to fulfill its
INDC targets for 2030 easily and the focus now lies on the long-term planning. Identifying challenges,
such as the need for improvements in the transmission infrastructure and facilitating access to low cost
finance, is important for successful development. Currently, there is a market shift towards renewable
energy sources (RES) through decreasing prices for renewable power generation, including a rapid
innovation in technology [9,10].
The role of coal, and the competition with other fuels for financial resources and policy
considerations, is also addressed by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) [11] and Tripathi et al. [12].
The Indian energy sector has also been subject to model-based analysis in the context of recent
policy and technology developments. In the context of the global sustainability initiative launched by
Sachs [13] and Transport Scenarios by Dhar et al. [14], both studies identify possible challenges and
opportunities of a low-carbon transformation of the energy and economic systems.
Löffler et al. [15] developed a cost-minimal path for the global energy system up to 2050, including
India as part of ten global regions. The paper focuses on the interdependencies between traditionally
segregated sectors, including electricity, transportation, and heating. Due to the scale of the referenced
model, detail within the model node India is lost, which this paper will address.
A comparably different model-based approach is chosen by the Integrated Research and Action
for Development (IRADe) [16]. The IRADe’s low-carbon sustainable development (LCSD) model is a
Energies 2018, 11, 3001 3 of 23
dynamic, multi-sectoral and intertemporal linear programming activity analysis model based on an
input–output framework. In addition to scenarios which target the compliance with CO2 budgets of
155 Gt (LC1 scenario) and 133 Gt (LC2 scenario) for India by 2050 and a baseline scenario “dynamics
as usual (DAU)”, the IRADe also includes human development thresholds and well-being indicators
within the “visionary development (VD)”. The results of the LC1 and LC2 scenarios conclude that the
CO2 budgets can be met by 2050, but cause a decrease in the overall GDP growth throughout the years.
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has developed a multi-sector applied general
equilibrium model of the Indian economy that uses CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels to generate
a 2030 reference case [17]. Sectoral imports and exports capture transactions with the rest of the world.
The MIT developed various scenarios, such as the “emission intensity” scenario, which imposes India’s
NDCs, and the “non-fossil scenario”, corresponding to India’s non-fossil electricity capacity target of
40% installed non-fossil electricity capacity by 2030. The “combined” scenario simulates the jointly
pursued targets of both “emission intensity” and non-fossil electricity. While both “emission intensity”
and “combined scenario” lead to the same emission intensity in 2030, the combined scenario includes
the additional constraints of non-fossil electricity targets.
Shukla et al. propose an integrated modeling framework [18,19] for analyzing alternative
development pathways with equal cumulative CO2 emissions within the first half of the 21st century.
They provide a comparison of alternative development strategies on multiple indicators, including
energy security, air quality, and technology stocks. Short and long-term drivers of decarbonization
pathways for several regions, including Europe, the United States, China, and India are explored in a
multi-model decomposition analysis by Marcucci and Fragkos [20]. Their research finds that in the
short term, energy efficiency improvements are the key strategy to achieving current climate targets.
In a joint project between the Indian planning office National Institution for Transforming India (NITI
Aayog) and MIT, Singh et al. [17] employed a numerical economy-wide model of India with energy
sector detail to simulate the impact of India’s commitments to the Paris Climate Agreement.
Focusing on India’s important renewable potentials, Gulagi et al. [21] explored the conditions
under which India could be supplied by 100% RES by 2050. Similar exercises, with a lower level
of detail, for a 100% renewables-based energy supply for India were prepared by Teske et al. [22],
Jacobsen et al. [23] and Löffler et al. [24]. International organizations, too, have put a focus on India
and its energy challenges, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) [25] World Energy Outlook
(“India Focus”). Shortcomings of the above-mentioned research, however, include a limited focus on
electric power (no sector coupling), which will be addressed in this paper.
This paper adds to the existing literature by exploring alternative pathways to sustainable energy
system development in India that respect both the specifics of the current energy system, but also
stringent climate targets and global technological trends favoring non-fossil, low-cost solutions.
We deploy an open-source linear cost-optimizing global energy system model (GENeSYS-MOD)
to analyze different scenarios to meet increasing demand in India until 2050. A particular feature of
the model is the regionalization of India into 10 regions. Thus, the model is able to illustrate regional
idiosyncrasies, as well as potential imbalances, in the future energy system. The model not only
focusses on the electricity sector, but also provides an in-depth analysis of the heat and transportation
sectors. The implementation of different scenarios enables a qualitative comparison of the total cost for
the specific optimized energy pathways until 2050. Thus, the results provide a comparability of the
total cost of the different scenarios.
Projecting future energy scenarios for India also needs to account for other aspects besides the
technical potential of renewables. An assessment of present literature and expert interviews is therefore
used to set the modeled low-carbon energy transformation in context with the social, political and
economic environment. The low-carbon transformation of the energy sector is not solely driven by
climate consideration, but is inserted into a complex process of sustainable development that includes
(amongst others) reducing health risk, affordable energy and a circular economy. In order to make
an evaluation about whether the country is truly able to become mostly RES based in 2050, further
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implications on India’s energy transformation have to be considered. The main sources for the literature
review regarding the contextualization of the model results were, in particular “The Political Economy
of Clean Energy Transitions“ by Arent et al. [26], which is a distilled compendium of cross-cutting
academic projects on clean energy transitions, “India’s low carbon transition” by Pandey [27], “India:
Meeting Energy Needs for Development While Addressing Climate Change” by Joshi et al. [28],
and “Coal Transition in India-Assessing India´s energy transition options” by Vishwanathan et al. [29].
After this introduction, Section 2 sketches out the status quo of the energy system in India with
respect to existing technologies and recent trends on policies and technological developments. Section 3
provides a non-technical description of the model, and develops the three scenarios, the results of
which are reported and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 identifies potential barriers to a low carbon
transition and is followed by the concluding Section 6.
2. Status Quo of the Indian Energy Sector
2.1. Energy Mix
The current energy mix of India is dominated by coal, with a share of 58% of electricity generation
in 2017, and 193 GW installed capacity. India is the third largest producer of coal and still holds the fifth
biggest reserves [30]. Most of India’s coal resources can be found in the eastern regions of Jharkand,
Chhattisgarh, and Odisha [31]; they are also the basis for the heavy industry, like steel and metallurgy,
benefitting from close-by coking coal and convenient supply chains. The coal sector is currently one
of the strongest lobbying groups in Indian energy politics. The public mining company Coal India
Limited (CIL) alone employs over 310,000 people [32]. Power production relies mostly on coal and the
biggest share of installed coal capacities has been added in the last 15 years [31]. Around 45% of all
Indian thermal power plant capacities are coal based and younger than 10 years. This implies that the
remaining power plants will potentially not be in line with medium and long-term climate targets.
Natural gas contributes about 7.2% to electric power generation [33]. A large share of the natural
gas has to be imported and—given the relatively high cost—natural gas has not yet obtained a
significant share of the electricity mix. Nuclear energy plays an important political role, in particular
in regional and international conflicts (e.g., with Pakistan), but its contribution to electricity generation
is small (2.7% of generation and capacity) [34].
Small-scale and large-scale hydropower have a share of 20% and 16% in installed capacity and
electricity generation, respectively. There is a controversial discussion about the future development
potential of hydropower, which has a high theoretical potential, but significant practical and political
challenges to its realization [8].
Renewable energy in India has several applications, the most important being biomass fuels for
cooking and heating. Non-commercial energies, mainly biofuels and waste, made up about 23.1% of
India’s primary energy supply in 2015 [1]. With respect to electricity, the installation of grid-connected
renewable generation capacities (excluding large-scale hydropower) is small, but rapidly rising at a
rate of 20–25% annually over the last 15 years [7,8]. Wind energy dominates this trend, accounting for
32.8 GW of installed capacity, followed by solar photovoltaics (PV) (17.1 GW), and small hydropower
(4.4 GW) as of January 2018 [35]. India’s renewable energy sector has already reached a size of
economic relevance for the whole country. India has a total renewable capacity share, including large
hydro power, of around 32% of its installed capacity as of January 2018 [36]. In 2016, it directly and
indirectly employed around 385,000 people (large hydropower plants add additional 200,000 jobs) in
the renewable energy sector [37]. From April 2014 to December 2016, the equity flow into India from
foreign investors surpassed US$ 2 billion [38], which was established under the Paris Agreement and
is to be fully implemented in the next couple of years. As these types of investments will continue to
grow [39], specific plans for an expansion of investments into renewables in developing countries have
been designed. India’s Prime Minister Modi, along with former French President Hollande, initialized
the International Solar Alliance to mobilize US$ 1 trillion of investment worldwide into solar energy
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programs [40]. In addition to fiscal incentives such as accelerated depreciation, India’s government
has also eased the path for renewable projects [38]. Some examples are the setup of big solar parks
with over 500 MW over the coming years, and mandatory ratios for rooftop solar to involve cities in
renewable investments.
Just like coal, the installed capacities for renewables vary significantly between different states
and regions [26]. The western regions have invested much more into renewables compared to the rest
of the country. These states are almost all governed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the national
ruling party. Furthermore, these states are also the ones with very little coal and steel industry.
2.2. Government Plans
2.2.1. Official Plans by the Indian Government
The CEA government regularly establishes longer-term development plans, the most recent one
ranging from 2017 to 2022 [2]. This plan includes a capacity increase of about 50 GW of coal-based
power projects currently under way, as well as an increase in RES share (Table 1). However, the plan
also states that no additional coal power plants are required after 2022. The CEA also predicts additions
of 4.3 GW of natural gas, and 2.8 GW of nuclear power until 2022.
Table 1. India’s renewable energy sources (RES) addition in GW predicted by the Central Electricity
Authority of India (CEA) based on GOI—Ministry of Power [2].
RES Category Installed Capacity ason 31 March 2016
Expected Capacity Addition
from 2017 to 2022
Target RES Installed
Capacity as on 31 March 2022
Expected Capacity Addition
from 2022 to 2027
Solar 18.7 81.3 100 50
Wind 31 29 60 40
Biomass 5.4 4.6 10 7
Small Hydro 4.5 0.5 5 3
Total 59.7 115.3 175 100
Simultaneously, the CEA has set ambitious plans to expand renewable capacities by 2022 (Table 2).
Thereby, the summarized total capacity addition until 2022 is targeted at 137.8 GW [2]. Consequently,
the expected share of “non-fossil” based installed capacity, which is defined as nuclear power,
hydropower, and RES by the CEA, is likely to increase to 46.8% by the year 2022 and will further
increase up to 56.5% by the year 2027. Total renewable energy generation of about 20.3% will contribute
to the total energy generation requirement in 2022 [2].
Table 2. India’s RES addition predicted by the CEA based on GOI—Ministry of Power [2].
Year Energy Requirement (TWh) 1 Peak Demand (GW) 2
2015 1114 153.4
2022 1611 235.3
2027 2132 317.7
1 After considering reduction in demand due to demand side management (DSM). 2 After reducing solar and wind
generation (i.e., variable renewable energy (VRE) generation).
3. Model and Scenarios
3.1. Global Energy System Model: A Linear Energy System Model
This paper uses a modified version of the GENeSYS-MOD, an open source tool for the linear
optimization of energy systems. It is based on the open-source energy modeling system (OSeMOSYS)
by Howells et al. [41] and minimizes a cost function to find the lowest discounted cost solution
for an energy system to meet a given energy demand. It also allows for temporal and regional
disaggregation and is thereby able to model pathways of development of diverse energy systems.
In particular, our implementation is based on the version of GENeSYS-MOD by Löffler et al. [15],
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whereby calculations were done using their general algebraic modeling system (GAMS) code adaption
based on the initial OSeMOSYS GAMS translation by Noble [42]. GENeSYS-MOD is a powerful tool to
help to identify the lowest-cost solutions and pathways for the energy transformation necessary to
keep global warming below 2 ◦C.
One of the strengths of GENeSYS-MOD is its adaptable and flexible structure. As shown in
Figure 1, it is organized into multiple blocks. The basic OSeMOSYS implementation contains seven
blocks, including the objective function, costs, storage, capacity adequacy, energy balance, constraints,
and emissions. GENeSYS-MOD includes three additional blocks renewable target, trade, and transportation,
as well as a reworked implementation of the storage block. All these blocks serve different functionalities
within the energy system model, as all costs, energy production, consumption values, and constraints,
such as on investments or capacity additions, need to be accounted for. The block capacity adequacy
ensures that necessary capacities are met at all times, while the energy balance levels energy use and
production, taking into account efficiencies of technologies. A more detailed discussion of the blocks
composing the model can be found in Löffler et al. [15] and Howells et al. [41]. This research paper
includes an endogenous transmission network upgrade as part of the trade block, which allows the
model to extend existing transmission capacities, focusing on the trade of electricity. For this extent,
capacities of grid infrastructure, as well as capacity expansion costs based on line length, have been
added to the model equations.
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Löffler et al. [15]. OSeMOSYS: open-source energy modeling syste .
The original, global model application was adjusted for the analysis of India’s energy system on a
detailed level. Amongst other things, we have introduced a constraint on renewable capacity extensions
(50% on previous figure every five years), which reflects institutional and political constraints of
expanding renewables. Also, grid connections betwee the ten regions can now be calculated
endogenously, improving the interpr tation of the sp tial aspects of en rgy system developm nt.
3.2. Data and Limits of Our Model
Our model requires strong assumptions for input; hence, reliable data on, i.e., demand or RES
potentials is essential (see Appendix A for key representative data). The power, heat (Table A1),
and transport (Table A2) demand in our model is significantly determined by projected population
growth and to a smaller extent due to a rise in urbanization [43]. Due to the integrated modeling
approach for the entire modeling period from 2015 until 2050, only a limited number of time slices per
year can be included (six time slices, including three distinct seasons, winter, summer and intermediate
(autumn, spring), each consisting of day and night to model seasonal fluctuations, respectively,
see Table A3). Furthermore, cost developments of implemented technologies are given exogenously.
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The results allow for a both qualitative and quantitative assessment for: (1) whether India can
achieve an energy system consisting of 100% RES; (2) where the current trend is going; and (3) where
we see further steps are necessary.
3.3. Regional Disaggregation of the Indian Energy System
India has an enormous potential for renewable energies. Due to geographical circumstances,
regional disparities in potentials for renewable energy technologies occur and are considered within
the model according to Table 3. In total, India has a total solar power potential of 11,195 GW as of
2015 [44]. Estimates of India’s wind power potential vary greatly, depending on assumptions on
efficiency, hub heights, turbine-size and land-use considerations. The model is based on data which
is retrieved from a report of India’s wind power potential by Hosain et al. [34]. The total onshore
wind power potential for India is estimated to range between 2733 GW and 6439 GW. The highest
potentials are observed in the western and southern regions, where most of the installed onshore wind
capacities already exist. Data regarding India’s offshore wind energy potentials are retrieved from
Löffler et al. [15] and are proportionally assigned to the coastal regions (see Section 3.1) according to
the coastal kilometers of the relevant regions.
Table 3. RES potentials in GW based on GOI – Ministry of Power [45] and Hosain et al. [44].
N = north. NW = north-west. W = west. CW = central-west. CS = central-south. S = south. E = east.
CE = central-east. NE = north-east. UP = Uttar Pradesh. PV: photovoltaics.
RES Technology N NW W CW CS S E CE NE UP
Solar PV 724 3096 1705 2069 1135 391 276 500 1000 300
Onshore wind 0 394 359 555 955 309 154 0 5 2
Offshore wind 0 0 61 41 14 74 0 0 0 0
Hydro 51 4 3 7 11 5 10 1 59 1
Hydro energy can be divided into large and small hydropower. In India, large hydropower is
defined to have a capacity of more than 25 MW, whereas small hydropower has a capacity of less
than 25 MW [45]. According to this definition, the country has a total installed capacity of more than
35 GW in large and small hydropower cumulated in 2015 [46]. These capacities are mostly located in
the northern regions, as well as in the central–south areas. India has a potential of more than 151 GW
of large hydropower, especially in the northern region, due to the Himalaya Mountains and other
important river systems such as the Indus. The north, north-west (NW), and north-east (NE) account
for more than 75% of the total large hydropower potential in India. In addition, small hydropower has
a potential of 19.7 GW.
In order to represent its geographical, industrial, and political diversity, India is split into different
zones. We follow the approach by Gulagi et al. [47] and split India into ten zones, along respective
federal state borders (Figure 2). Thus, the following regions are obtained:
• the north (N) consists of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhand, and Is
characterized by a decent potential of solar power and very large hydropower potential (51 GW);
• the NW consists of Punjab and Rajasthan, quite rural regions with a significant potential of
solar power;
• Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh form the west (W) region, with a broad portfolio of renewables
potential (solar, onshore and offshore wind);
• central-west (CW) is comprised of Maharashtra, Goa, and Chhattisgarh, likewise large solar and
wind resources, but, particular in Chhattisgarh, a higher level of heavy industrialization and coal;
• India’s central-south (CS) is comprised of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, with the highest
onshore wind potential of the country (955 GW);
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• the south (S) comprises Tamil Nadu and Kerala, also featuring solar and wind potential, but very
little fossil fuels (except for the liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminal in Chennai);
• the east (E), consisting mainly of Orissa and West Bengal, appended by Sikkim, has quite heavy
industrial roots, and is continuously struggling for electricity supply;
• somewhat similar, the central-east (CE), consisting of Bihar and Jharkhand, has high energy
demand, but also a significant potential, in particular of solar energy (1000 GW);
• the NE consists of the somewhat isolated states of Assam Arumachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur,
Mizoram, Tripura, and Meghalaya, with some solar and significant potential hydro resources
(59 GW);
• Uttar Pradesh (UP), bordering the national capital territory of Delhi, is one of the largest and most
heavily industrialized states, with a particular dynamic energy demand.
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3.4.1. i i i s Only Scenario
The li it issions only (LEO) scenario describes a development wher the goal of limiting
global ar ing to 2 ◦C is respected, and the globally available CO2 budget is distributed according
to current population size. Generally, this corresponds to the 450 ppm scenario of the IEA [48] (now
renamed “Sustainable Development Scenario”). The derived emission budget for India is about
118 gigatons from 2015 until 2050 in order to meet the 2 ◦C target. This budget would be considerably
lower if the distribution was based on other characteristics, e.g., GDP or current emissions. The LEO
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scenario informs decision makers about the potential cost for the Indian economy, especially compared
to the rather deviant scenarios and the respective role of fossil fuels and renewables therein.
3.4.2. Business as Usual Scenario
In the business as usual (BAU) scenario, the Indian government (and all other governments) stick
to given commitments and signed treaties, but nothing more. In international terms, this corresponds
to the new policy scenario (NPS) of the IEA. The BAU scenario uses the projected capacities for
renewable energy capacities until 2040 of the new policies scenario by the IEA [31]. These projected
capacities are included as upper limits and thus restrict the construction of renewable generation
capacities in the model. No specific emission limits for CO2 or other GHGs are included. The goal of
the BAU scenario is to compare the resulting CO2 emissions with the other two scenarios, where the
national CO2 emissions are fixed by using a national budget. Moreover, the point of interest lies on
the pathways after 2040, when the usage of renewable energies is not limited by the projected IEA
capacities anymore.
3.4.3. 100% Renewable Energy Sources Scenario
The Indian government has regularly updated its commitment towards using more RES in the
future. In contrast to the LEO scenario, the aim of the 100% RES scenario therefore examines if it
would be possible to fulfill the total energy demand with 100% renewable energy in 2050. Therefore,
the model is restricted such that no non-renewable energies, including nuclear energy, can be used
by 2050. The included CO2 budget of 60 gigatons corresponds with the goal to restrict the amount of
global warming to only 1.5 ◦C.
3.4.4. Further Assumptions
We adopt the assumptions on energy and electricity demand taken from the IEA 2017 World
Energy Outlook. A sensitivity analysis is added for all scenarios that reduces demand growth by 50%.
This accounts for the uncertainty on increasing energy efficiency, new demand patterns, and a slower
adaptation of very energy- and electricity-intensive demand behavior. The assumptions on the cost of
conventional and renewable energies (Table 4) are based on a variety of sources. [49–51].
Table 4. Assumptions on the cost of conventional and renewable energies in India based on
Schröder et al. [49], Ram et al. [50] and the Energy Technology Reference Indicator (ETRI) [51].
Technology 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Cost in
M€/GW
Onshore wind 1280 1152 1050 972 940 900 860 823
Offshore wind 2560 2304 2100 1944 1880 1800 1720 1664
Large-scale hydropower 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826
Utility-scale solar PV 1000 580 466 390 337 300 270 246
Biomass 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656
Cost in
M€/PJ
Hard coal 1.06 1.11 1.17 1.23 1.29 1.35 1.42 1.49
Natural gas 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.30
4. Results and Interpretation
4.1. Scenario Results and Comparisons
Model results suggest that in all three scenarios, the total energy demand can be met, and that
a major change in the fuel mix, away from fossil (mainly coal-based production), to renewables is
likely to occur. This change is not only imposed by environmental constraints, but also pushed by the
increasing competitiveness of renewables, mainly solar energy.
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4.1.1. Limited Emissions Only Scenario Results
In the LEO scenario, the share of fossil fuels is gradually reduced over time, though some fossil
capacities are still available in 2050. In the electricity sector, upon which we focus on in this paper,
solar takes over a leading role in power generation, resulting in an accumulated share of 69% for all
regions in 2050 (Figure 3). Apart from solar, wind and hydropower are the main sources for power
generation in 2050 with 17% and 9%, respectively. While wind power is continuously increasing in
its capacity after the year 2035, hydropower stays almost constant over all periods. While coal is the
main component in the power generation energy mix in 2015 with a share of 82%, it continuously
reduced until 2050. A slight increase in coal usage can be observed in 2050. This is due to the huge
increase in power generation (induced by sector-coupling effects in the other sectors) between 2045
and 2050, which is compensated for by the already installed coal capacity. Despite the growing energy
demand, the power generated by coal is reduced by more than half by the year 2025. In 2050, coal still
has a share of about 5% in power generation. Nuclear power is hardly used during the entire period,
nor does natural gas play any significant role. Figure 3 illustrates the pathway within the LEO scenario.
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In the rest of the nergy system, heat is dominated by biomass (60%) and coal-based
heating (38%) in 205 . Natural gas, el ctric heating, and solar heati r r le (Figure 4).
The transportati n sector has the c ance to become emission free by 2050 as well.
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Demands for passenger transportation will be fully supplied by electric fueled rail services
and battery electric vehicles (BEV) in 2050 (Figure 5). As demand is assumed to increase by up to
3000 million freight km per year in 2050 (+273% compared to 2015), an increase in H2 powered road
trucks and electrical rail traffic can be observed from 2025 on. In addition, the shipping sector will
completely become independent of conventional sources (conv.) by using biomass-powered means
by 2050. Air traffic is assumed to convert from conventional fuels to hydrogen-based technologies
(predicted breakthrough between 2030 and 2035).
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Figure 5. India’s freight tr s rt ti athway in the LEO scenario.
In the freight sector, conve tional ships in 2015 will shift towards biomass (biom.) powered means.
On the road, inte n l combustion engines will be rep ac d by hy rogen and biomass run vehicles.
For freight transportation by ail, petroleum pow red trains will fade out in favor o electric trains by
2050 (Figure 6).
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4.1.2. Comparison with Other Scenarios
A comparison between the LEO scenario and the BAU scenario confirms that with less stringent
climate targets, more fossil energy (mainly coal) is used for electrification. Figure 7 shows the difference
between the generation mixes of t LEO scenario, comp r d with the BAU scenari . In both sc narios,
complete decarbonization of the Indi n en rgy system is not accomplished. Diffe ences mainly occur
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in the more dominant usage of natural gas and coal-based energy throughout the years. Overall, coal
as an energy carrier is still declining in the years leading to 2050, having its peak in 2040. Coal still
has a share of about 7.4%, whilst natural gas accounts for nearly 1% of the energy production in 2050.
Compared to the LEO scenario, solar power (66%) develops on a smaller basis. Wind (17%) and hydro
power (9%) remain rather constant over the years. The total emissions are about 9% higher compared
to the LEO scenario, but still achieving the 2 ◦C goal.
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Figure 8 shows a si il parison between the LEO scenario and the 100% RES scenario.
The small share of coal (and the marginal share of n tural gas) disappears by 2050, and more solar
and onshore wind are generated. The contribution of offshore wind is marginal, and hydroelectricity
observes a smaller share in the 10 % scenario.
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Figure 8. Comparison between the LEO and the 100% RES scenarios.
As stated in the scenario description, the model is forced to only use renewable energies in 2050
in the 100% RES scenario. This leads to a much higher power demand over the years, which is due to
the increased usage of power-to-x technologies in the heat and transportation sector. Compared to
the other scenarios, power trading between the nodes is even more relevant because of the regional
differences in the potentials for renewable energy generation. Natural gas does not play a role in
the energy mix within this scenario. Solar and wind power replace the then phased-out coal-based
energy, leading to a 15% decrease in CO2 emissions until 2050. The research shows that with the given
potentials, a 100% renewable energy system, meeting the 1.5 ◦C climate target, would be feasible in the
year 2050. Regarding heat and mobility, no significant differences were found.
Similar results and transformation pathways were found by Gulagi et al. [21,47]. Comparing the
country-wide scenario by Gulagi et al. [47] to our 100% RES scenario, a moderate phase out of coal
and fast expansion of solar PV and onshore wind can be observed. While India’s power generation
is dominated by coal in 2015, solar PV establishes itself as the key technology by 2050, followed by
onshore wind and biomass [47]. Differences in absolute values can be traced back to the ability of
GENeSYS-MOD to also include the heat and transport sector.
4.2. Regionalization of Scenario Results
The analysis of the regional supply mixes reveals significant differences (see Appendix B). In the
LEO scenario in 2050, solar is the dominant source of supply in all regions, except for two: the north
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and the NE, both mountainous regions with a lot of hydropower. Onshore wind is most prominent in
the west and the south, whereas offshore wind occurs hardly anywhere.
Starting from 2020, solar capacities heavily increase in all regions, whereby CE and UP are relying
nearly solely on solar power in the final year. The north and NE regions exhibit the highest hydro
potentials and account for about 64% of India’s total hydropower generation.
In the LEO scenario, coal electrification is mainly concentrated in UP in 2050 (26%). The nodes CW
(2%), NW (5%), south (3%), and west (6%) play a minor role. With relatively modest wind resources,
UP is the only state that uses natural gas electrification.
All scenarios have a similar regionalization of energy sources. However, more conventional fuels
are used in the BAU scenario, especially in the NW region (21%). In the 100% RES scenario, all regions
are relying on RES with a similar distribution as the LEO scenario, substituting the conventional energy
sources in the south-west, south-east, and UP with RES and electricity imports.
4.3. Energy System Cost and Long-Term Electricity Prices
Given that the energy mix between the three scenarios is not very different, it is not surprising
that the energy system costs are quite similar as well. With the BAU scenario having the lowest
discounted costs over the whole model period, it shows that feeding demand in the high-temperature
heat and freight transportation sectors based on power-based technologies is more cost-intensive than
using fossil fuels, especially in the case of high shares of RES. Although it might be the cheapest,
external cost and effects on the environment that are difficult to be quantified need to be kept in mind.
In comparison, the LEO scenario comes to a result with slightly higher costs (about 2%), while the
100% RES scenario results in 9% higher total discounted costs than the BAU scenario.
The average costs of electricity generation within the model will decline from 7.5 €cents/kWh
in 2015 to less than 3 €cents/kWh in 2050 in the LEO scenario. However, infrastructure and
transportation costs are not included. Nevertheless, variations in the power generating costs between
the technologies can be observed and depend on the different operational lifetimes, operational and
maintenance costs, as well as capital and fuel costs. Within the model, coal-based electricity ranges from
3.3 to 3.7 €cents/kWh. These costs are currently lower than the daily updated data of the Ministry of
Power [52], as they do not include the costs for infrastructure. Apart from that, renewable technologies
will become increasingly competitive, with solar and wind power observing the biggest reduction of
power generating costs over time, which drive coal-based generation out of the market. Utility-scale
solar power lies in the range of 1.3–2.8 €cents/kWh for power generation, with wind power ranging
from 3 to 5 €cents/kWh. At the same time, hydro power shows up with 2–3 €cents/kWh for electricity
generation within the model. Regarding the projections of Bloomberg New Energy Finance [53],
similarities can be observed as there will be a tipping point where coal will be replaced by cheap
renewable options. In between the regions of India, prices can vary up to 50%, which can be traced
back to different capacity factors and full load hours of generation facilities. While different climate
targets do play a role in the energy mix, their overall economic effects seem to be modest.
5. Barriers to the Low-Carbon Energy Transformation in India
As seen in the previous sections, renewable energy technologies have an enormous potential in
India and a 100% RES based energy system in 2050 can be achieved. However, experience shows
that economic theory and reality do not always match. An assessment of present literature and
expert interviews aims to contextualize the low-carbon energy transformation and the model results
within the social, political and economic contexts. The low-carbon transformation of the energy sector
is not solely driven by climate consideration, but is inserted into a complex process of sustainable
development that includes (amongst others) reducing health risk, affordable energy and a circular
economy. In order to make an evaluation about whether the country is truly able to become 100%
RES-based in 2050, further implications on India’s energy transformation have to be considered.
Based on this literature review, those factors can be divided into social, political, and economic barriers.
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5.1. Social Barriers
In acknowledgement of the complexities associated with the low-carbon transformation in India,
it is important to contextualize the transition against the overall economic situation of the broader
population. India, having a GDP per capita of 1974.76 USD [54], a high share of its population living in
extreme poverty, and a rapid urbanization, economic growth is often perceived as more pressuring
than investment into green development projects [27].
Currently, there are still more than 300 million people with no access to electricity [8].
Consequently, environmental standards for power plants are perceived as barriers to economic
growth. A prime example for this is the protest against higher environmental standards in 2014
by the population of Vapi, one of the most polluted cities in India [55]. This can mainly be explained
by the cities’ dependence on its large and highly-polluting pharmaceutical and chemical industries
and the public fear of losing much-needed jobs and capital [26].
A low-carbon transition as planned by governmental motivations, however, holds various
opportunities for further economic growth in green industries—despite the rate of employment
in the coal industry decreasing constantly since 2002 [37]. Especially in regard to the enormous solar
potential and the ambitions to extend the national capacities in wind and solar (see Section 2.2.1),
it could generate up to 330,000 jobs over the next five years, i.e., in manufacturing, project design,
construction, business development, and operations and maintenance [56]. Changing the perception
of the low-carbon transition as a barrier for economic growth by educational work and improving
social circumstances is thus crucial for a successful energy transformation.
5.2. Political Barriers
A significant barrier to the increase in RES are lobbies of the conventional energy sector.
The coal industry still meets most of India’s energy demand and employs over 400,000 people.
Their businesses include rail, port, and road transport, loading and unloading, as well as the power
plants (see Section 2.1). In addition, a substantial portion of the coal-mining sector is dominated by
the state-owned company CIL. A possible depletion of coal mining would therefore have a negative
influence on the government’s budget. Consequently, past and current Indian governments have been
pushing the expansion of the coal mining sector and plan to increase the annual production from a
current level of 600 million tons to 1.5 billion tons in 2020 [26].
Not only external factors are of importance for the implementation of policies in a country.
Internal factors, such as the lack of coordination and cooperation within and between various Indian
institutions and other stakeholders, slow down and restrict the transformation to RES. Currently,
multiple agencies (i.e., the Federal Ministry for New and Renewable Energy, Ministry of Power,
Department of Environment and Forests, Department of Rural Development, as well as corresponding
agencies in each state) have overlapping areas of responsibilities regarding renewable energy. A good
example of this lack of coordination is the implementation of the generation based incentive (GBI)
for solar power, a scheme provided to, among other things, “support small grid solar power projects
connected to the distribution grid (below 33 KV) to the state utilities” [57]. Soon after its announcement
by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), the Indian Renewable Energy Development
Agency (IREDA) started accepting applications for solar projects under the GBI scheme. Later, however,
the Indian government rejected all applications that were made before the official announcement of the
scheme through the federal gazette [58]. While this reaction is justified and the IREDA should not have
accepted applications in advance, it is this lack of coordination between institutions that complicates
the implementation of policies and discourages investors.
Furthermore, there are currently two policy narratives for the development of the Indian energy
system: the centralized approach, in which the Indian government mainly pushes for the integration of
renewables through a unified power grid, and the former being decentralized, providing basic energy
access using off-grid solutions [59].
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5.3. Economic Barriers
The fact that India’s energy demand is predicted to increase heavily until 2050 forms one of the
biggest challenges in its low-carbon transformation. The growth can be traced back to the increasing
electricity access, especially in rural areas, and to urbanization. Lifestyle and dietary changes, i.e.,
increasing demand for meat, dairy products, and luxury goods are all factors which contribute to India’s
growing energy consumption [60]. Growing electrification in the agricultural sector, and more reliable
energy supply for industry and highly populated areas, are coupled with India’s economic growth.
Merging those interactions represents a challenge for the energy system. Within the model results,
India’s electricity generation is estimated to increase by a factor of ten from 2015 to 2050, whereby the
analysis shows that renewable energy potentials are sufficient. Correspondingly, Bhushan [8] points
out that the organization of the distribution systems needs to be tackled. Thus, an ambitious increase
in power-generating capacity and change towards renewable technologies on a large scale is necessary
to ensure a sustainable power supply.
In general, renewable energy projects tend to have little or no fuel, operating, or maintenance
cost, but their relative initial investment costs tend to be much higher than for those of conventional
energy systems [58]. Renewables in India are often around 24–32% more expensive compared to
similar projects financed in the US or Europe. Indian financial market conditions are the main cause of
high interest rates for renewable energy. Growth, high inflation, and country risks all contribute [61].
Therefore, by requiring these large-scale upfront investments, renewable energy projects are reliant on
long-term investors [27].
It has been difficult, however, to attract those long-term investors for a multitude of reasons.
First and foremost, India’s legal and regulatory system is often viewed as uncertain and risky,
as manifested in various forms like changes in tax codes, a lack of protection for policy changes
and enforcement of contracts [27]. Furthermore, there is a deficiency in information about renewable
energy projects, as well as the value of different companies. That information, however, is crucial for
the analysis and decision-making of investors.
India’s losses in the transmission and distribution (T&D) power grid are one of the highest
worldwide, with a total share of 19.4% [62]. Those high T&D losses are an additional consequence of
the widespread power theft, illegal hook-ups, and a low payment morale [63]. Agriculture users in
particular pay for less energy than they consume [63]. Regarding the model results, a 100% RES-based
power supply is only feasible if regions can compensate imbalances in RES potentials through an
efficient power exchange. A sensitivity analysis showed that a decrease down to 5% of losses ensures a
feasible power supply for all regions in the 100% RES scenario. Overcoming this technical challenge
through promoting investments forms one of the biggest hurdles in the low-carbon transformation
for India.
To finance large-scale investments, private investors could impact the velocity of the
transformation within the energy system. Considering the current share of 6.7% private players
in the transmission network, it stands out that the regulatory framework is still not exhausting the full
financing potential through private contributions. The “Doing Business” ranking by The World Bank
underlines those circumstances, whereas India is on rank 185 in “Dealing with Construction Permits”
and on rank 172 in ‘Enforcing Contracts’ out of 190 economies by comparison [64]. For that reason,
the government is encouraging private investments. Financial mechanisms and policy frameworks for
a faster commercialization of renewable energy technologies are analyzed by Balachandra et al. [65].
Currently, increasing attention is given to off-grid technologies, such as solar rooftops with battery
back-ups to achieve energy access to all regions. This also concerns households in highly populated
areas to become independent from local network operators [8]. Despite the high willingness to invest
in off-grid technologies, low-income households still need to be addressed [66]. Within the National
Electricity Plan, 40 GW of solar rooftops are planned to be installed by March 2022 to relieve the local
power grids [2].
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Regarding the model, the results of all three scenarios visualize that the most economically viable
energy path leads to an energy mix dominated by solar. With a total share of 68% of solar energy in
power generation, India will become a solar reliant country in 2050, which consequently takes risks
within. Especially in times when solar power generation is very low, security of energy supplies is
difficult to ensure. Considering the concentrated energy demand in conurbations (like UP), on the
other hand, makes clear that a sufficient power supply can only be reached if the power system
gets optimized. Therefore, storage technologies play a significant role to compensate for fluctuating
energy generation.
6. Conclusions
With 6% of global GHG emissions and a predicted future increase, India plays a determining role in
future climate policies. In this paper, we explore energy pathways for India from 2015 to 2050 by applying
the GENeSYS-MOD to different scenarios. The model results of the LEO scenario visualize the future
importance of solar energy within the low-carbon transformation. Even without setting a strict restriction
for using conventional energy sources in 2050, renewables (especially solar) will satisfy almost the whole
energy demand in 2050, whereas conventional sources will have a negligible share of 2.8% (mainly located
in densely populated regions, e.g., UP). In 2050, the share of solar takes over 67% of the whole power
production, followed by wind (23%) and hydropower (6%) in the LEO scenario.
For progressive planning, crucial circumstances have to be kept in mind. First of all, India as
a developing economy is facing an increasing demand in power, and energy access is an ongoing
issue, especially in rural areas [2]. Furthermore, within the conventional energy sources, the future
of coal electrification depends on market design, the implementation of existing environmental norms,
and regional development perspectives in affected areas. Apart from that, the recent growth of utility-scale
solar needs to be accompanied by distributed solar (and batteries), both at the urban and the rural level,
to become sustainable and extend the rural electrification progress. As current plans are perceived to be
achieved before 2025, set goals submitted in the INDCs and the current Five-Year Plan are assessed as
not ambitious enough. Moreover, it is illustrated within the BAU scenario that current electricity plans
of the Indian government diverge from needed requirements to contribute to the global rising limit of
2 ◦C to pre-industrial levels. Tightening the government’s goals until 2030 would consequently both
counterbalance and reduce the total cost of the path from there on to 2050, which is projected to be a
largely renewable energy-based system. Consequently, fulfilling the Paris Agreement will require stronger
efforts in India’s current policies, especially in the last two decades leading up to 2050 in comparison
to a smoother and more cost-efficient increase of RES over time. While the model incorporates a high
level of detail on a multitude of technologies, inter-sectoral-connections, and the resulting energy mix, its
rather rough time disaggregation has to be noted. Variable renewable energy (VRE) technologies and their
inherent unstableness, creating a need for flexibility options such as storage, might require a more detailed
distinction between time slices. Future research should focus on how to implement such an assessment for
even more detailed data on the different sectors and the effects of variable RES on the electricity system.
A reduction of the losses and tackling power theft within the power trade would ensure an efficient
overcoming of imbalances in between the regions of different renewable energy potentials. Making up
leeway in the transmission grid sector is one of the important actions. The results for the 100% RES
scenario illustrate the cost-optimized pathway towards 2050 for a technically feasible energy system based
on 100% RES, a finding which has been shown by Gulagi et al. [21,47] independently. Additionally, the
difference between the LEO and 100% RES scenario in the use of conventional sources indicates that a
100% renewable energy supply is an ambitious goal for 2050. Noticing the negligibly higher total cost of an
energy system based on 100% RES to the LEO benchmark or the BAU scenario, this goal may be ambitious
but not impossible to achieve.
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Appendix A. Model Parameters
Table A1. Regional electricity, high and low heat demand in PJ.
Region 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Annual electricity demand (PJ)
North 136.51 173.39 220.25 279.76 355.36 451.38 573.35 728.28
NW 700.57 889.87 1130.33 1435.77 1823.73 2316.53 2942.50 3737.60
West 620.66 788.38 1001.41 1272.01 1615.72 2052.31 2606.88 3311.30
CW 627.82 797.46 1012.95 1286.67 1634.35 2075.97 2636.93 3349.47
CS 590.04 749.47 951.99 1209.24 1535.99 1951.04 2478.24 3147.90
South 440.51 559.55 710.74 902.80 1146.75 1456.62 1850.22 2350.17
East 319.53 405.87 515.54 654.85 831.80 1056.57 1342.07 1704.72
CE 153.64 195.15 247.89 314.87 399.95 508.03 645.31 819.68
NE 53.42 67.86 86.19 109.48 139.07 176.65 224.38 285.01
UP 373.60 474.55 602.78 765.66 972.55 1235.35 1569.16 1993.18
∑ 4016 5102 6480 8231 10,455 13,280 16,869 21,427
Annual high heat demand (PJ)
North 217.00 302.10 373.46 444.83 503.68 562.53 635.46 708.39
NW 1113.65 1550.38 1916.63 2282.88 2584.92 2886.96 3261.23 3635.50
West 986.63 1373.55 1698.02 2022.50 2290.09 2557.68 2889.26 3220.84
CW 998.00 1389.38 1717.60 2045.81 2316.49 2587.16 2922.57 3257.97
CS 937.95 1305.77 1614.23 1922.70 2177.09 2431.47 2746.69 3061.91
South 700.26 974.87 1205.16 1435.46 1625.38 1815.30 2050.63 2285.97
East 507.94 707.13 874.17 1041.22 1178.98 1316.74 1487.44 1658.15
CE 244.23 340.01 420.33 500.65 566.89 633.13 715.21 797.28
NE 84.92 118.22 146.15 174.08 197.11 220.14 248.68 277.22
UP 593.88 826.78 1022.09 1217.41 1378.48 1539.55 1739.14 1938.73
∑ 6384 8888 10,987 13,087 14,819 16,550 18,696 20,841
Annual low heat demand (PJ)
North 262.70 274.70 265.05 255.40 233.99 212.58 206.48 200.37
NW 1348.19 1409.77 1360.26 1310.74 1200.86 1090.99 1059.65 1028.31
West 1194.42 1248.97 1205.11 1161.24 1063.90 966.55 938.79 911.03
CW 1208.19 1263.37 1219.00 1174.63 1076.16 977.69 949.61 921.53
CS 1135.48 1187.34 1145.64 1103.94 1011.40 918.86 892.46 866.07
South 847.73 886.45 855.32 824.18 755.09 686.00 666.30 646.59
East 614.91 642.99 620.41 597.83 547.71 497.60 483.31 469.01
CE 295.67 309.17 298.31 287.45 263.36 239.26 232.39 225.51
NE 102.81 107.50 103.73 99.95 91.57 83.19 80.80 78.41
UP 718.96 751.80 725.39 698.99 640.39 581.80 565.09 548.38
∑ 7729 8082 7798 7514 6884 6254 6074 5895
Table A2. Regional demand for transportation in Gpkm (passenger) and Gtkm (freight).
Region 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Annual demand for passenger
transportation (Gpkm)
North 49 71 89 107 126 145 164 183
NW 252 364 458 552 647 743 841 940
West 223 323 406 489 573 658 745 832
CW 226 326 410 494 580 666 754 842
CS 212 307 386 465 545 625 708 791
South 158 229 288 347 407 467 529 591
East 115 166 209 252 295 339 384 429
CE 55 80 100 121 142 163 184 206
NE 19 28 35 42 49 57 64 72
UP 134 194 244 294 345 396 449 501
∑ 1443 2087 2625 3162 3710 4258 4822 5386
Annual demand for freight
transportation (Gtkm)
North 26 38 48 58 68 78 88 99
NW 136 196 247 297 349 400 453 506
West 120 174 219 263 309 355 402 449
CW 122 176 221 266 313 359 406 454
CS 114 165 208 250 294 337 382 427
South 85 123 155 187 219 252 285 318
East 62 90 113 136 159 183 207 231
CE 30 43 54 65 76 88 99 111
NE 10 15 19 23 27 31 35 39
UP 72 105 132 159 186 213 242 270
∑ 778 1125 1415 1704 2000 2295 2599 2903
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Table A3. Regional capacity factors for solar PV, onshore and offshore wind. WN = winter
night, WD = winter day, SN = summer night, SD = summer day, IN = intermediate night,
ID = intermediate day.
Region WN WD SN SD IN ID
Solar PV
North 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.28
NW 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.30
West 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.30
CW 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.29
CS 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.28
South 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.39
East 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.31
CE 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.30
NE 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.31
UP 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.31
Onshore wind
North 0.32 0.19 0.37 0.20 0.35 0.24
NW 0.32 0.12 0.48 0.30 0.26 0.12
West 0.28 0.17 0.36 0.42 0.22 0.13
CW 0.25 0.14 0.43 0.57 0.20 0.14
CS 0.27 0.13 0.44 0.52 0.20 0.13
South 0.17 0.14 0.29 0.46 0.12 0.13
East 0.23 0.09 0.33 0.29 0.20 0.14
CE 0.24 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.24 0.21
NE 0.33 0.17 0.24 0.20 0.36 0.24
UP 0.27 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.31 0.19
Offshore wind
NW 0.19 0.34 0.49 0.52 0.19 0.27
CW 0.14 0.22 0.47 0.42 0.15 0.13
CS 0.08 0.17 0.39 0.37 0.10 0.10
South 0.36 0.39 0.61 0.58 0.23 0.29
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